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Near the end of the summer of 1968 and near the close of the 90th
Congress, the U.S. Senate in fulfilling its advise and consent function,
engaged in some picayunish tactics behind the facade of protecting the
Constitution, and especially the principle of Separation of Powers assumed
to be connected with it.
The degradation of an important Senate function took place during
the time the Senate was considering the nomination by President Johnson
of Justice Abraham Fortas for Chief Justice. The individual objections
to the confirmation of Justice Fortas as Chief Justice were based mainly
upon petty personal and political attitudes.
Some of the Senators, however, ashamed of these narrow bases for
their objections proclaimed the broader grounds of reverence for the
Constitution, which they alleged Justice Fortas did not have, in that he had
violated one of its fundamental principles, the Separation of Powers, by
giving advisory opinions to the President, and by consulting with and
advising him on matters to which the President was giving Executive
consideration.
Not being able to make any specific charge, the unfriendly Senators
put forward the general charge of violating the principle of Separation
of Powers. That allegation was also connected with alleged "cronyism"
between the President and Justice Fortas, with the implication that a
Justice of the Supreme Court was giving advisory opinions to the Chief
Executive; an action they considered to be in violation of the principle
of Separation of Powers, a constitutional principle upon which the Justice
himself was able to rely in refusing to explain to the Senators certain
judicial opinions he had given in the Supreme Court.
All of this leads to the justifiable assumption that while all of the
men involved believed in the principle of Separation of Powers, they under-
stood it as a principle of belief, but not in the sense of its practical applica-
tion. It is not unreasonable to liken their concept of Separation of Powers
to the statement attributed to a philosopher concerning his concept of
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time. It is alleged that the philosopher said words to this effect: "I
understand time and know perfectly well what time is, but when I am
asked what time is, I know not what it is."
The burden of this article is to explain to a limited degree the meaning
of one aspect of the concept as it is applied to the Federal Government of
the United States, that aspect being advisory opinions.
Those who believe that the concept of Separation of Powers was
brought over by the Founding Fathers as a part of their legacy from the
British Constitution should get some enlightenment from the words of
Madison in The Federalist:
On the slightest view of the British Constitution we must perceive
that -the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no
means totally separate and distinct from each other. The executive
magistrate forms an integral part of the legislative authority. He alone
has the prerogative of making treaties with foreign sovereigns, which,
when made have, under certain limitations, the force of legislative acts.
All of the members of the judiciary department are appointed by him,
can be removed by him, on the address of the two houses of Parliament,
and form, when he pleases to consult them, one of his constitutional
councils. One branch of the legislative department forms also a great
constitutional council to the executive chief as, on another hand, it is
the sole depository of judicial power in cases of impeachment, and
invested with supreme appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The
judges again are so far connected with the legislative department as
often to attend and participate in its deliberations, though not admitted
to a legislative vote.
Madison goes on to quote Montesquieu as saying, "There can be no
liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person or body of magistrates, or if the power of judging be not separated
from the legislative and executive power."
From an examination of the constitutional governments existing at
the time, and the political history from which Montesquieu drew his
ideas, it is evident that he did not mean the departments of government
should have no partial agency in, nor control over, the acts of each other.
Montesquieu's insistence was this: "Where the whole power of one
department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power
of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution
are subverted."
Supporting his argument by reference to the state constitutions,
Madison said:
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Notwithstanding the emphatical and in some instances, the unquali-
fied terms in which the axiom, separation of powers, has been laid down,
there is not a single instance in which the several departments of power
have been kept absolutely separate and distinct. New Hampshire,
whose constitution was last formed, seems to 'have been fully aware of
the impossibility and inexpediency of avoiding any mixture whatever of
these departments, and has qualified the doctrine by declaring 'that the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers ought to be kept as separate
from, and independent of each other as the nature of a free government
will admit; or as is consistent with that chain of connection that binds
the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble band of unity
and amity.
Madison goes on to list ten states1 whose constitutions were written,
as he said, "after the principle of separation of powers had become an
object of political attention. Yet none of these states was able in spite
of expressions of intent to do so, to frame constitutions that accomplished
entire separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers." 2
The Federal Constitution nowhere expressly declares that the branches
of the Government must be kept separate and independent. Adherence to
the concept of Separation of Powers was best demonstrated by the framers
in assigning to separate articles of the Constitution, the creation, func-
tions, and powers of each of the three divisions of the Government.
Illustrating this is the established arrangement which follows:
Article I provides for the legislative branch, and begins "all legis-
lative powers herein granted are invested in a Congress . . . ." Article II
"The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States
of America." Article III "The judicial power of the United States shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish."
The doctrine of the separation of governmental powers .. . as a
complete denial of the capacity of one department of government to
exercise a kind of power assumed to belong peculiarly to one of the
others, does not obtain in our public law beyond the confines of the
printed page.
When we speak of the separation of the three great powers of gov-
ernment, and maintain that the separation is indispensable to public
liberty, we are to understand this maxim in a limited sense. It is not
meant to affirm that they must be kept wholly and entirely separate and
1 New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary-
land, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia.
'Federalist No. XLVII, ed. Paul L. Ford, pp. 319-26 (1898).
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distinct and have no common link of connection or dependence the
one upon the other in the slightest degree. The true meaning is that
the whole power of one of these departments should not be exercised by
the same 'hands which possess the whole power of either of the other
departments. . . .3
Advisory Opinions
Perhaps one of the most frequent applications of the principle of
Separation of Powers in constitutional law has been in relation to advisory
opinions.
In 1793 the Supreme Court refused to grant the request of President
Washington and Secretary of State Jefferson to construe the treaties and
laws of the United States pertaining to questions of international law
arising out of the wars of the French Revolution. Secretary Jefferson
said, "These treaties and laws were often presented under circumstances
which do not give a cognizance of them to the tribunals of the country."
After convening the court which considered the request, Chief Justice Jay
replied to President Washington concerning the functions of the three
departments of government. Chief Justice Jay wrote:
These being in certain respects checks upon each other and our being
judges in a court in the last resort, are considerations which afford
strong argument against our extra-judicially deciding the questions
alluded to, especially as the power given by the Constitution to the
President, of calling on the heads of departments for opinions, seems to
have been purposely as well as expressly united to the Executive De-
partments.
4
It might be worthwhile to state what is well known among legal
scholars, that the Court itself developed these rules of limitation. Since
1793 the Court has frequently reiterated the early view that the federal
courts organized under Article III cannot render advisory opinions, or
that the rendition of advisory opinions is not a part of the judicial powers
of the United States.
The case best known to law students on advisory opinions, remembered
perhaps because of the oddity of the name, is Muskrat v. United States.'
Even in the absence of the early precedent set by Chief Justice Jay, the
' Cullen, C. J. in Trustees of the Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas
and Electric Light and Power Co., 191 N.Y. 123; 83 N.E. 693 (1908).
' Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, 486-489.
'219 U.S. 346; 55 L.Ed. 246, 31 S. Ct. 250 (1911).
4
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rule that Constitutional Courts will render no advisory opinions would
have logically emerged from the rule subsequently developed, that Consti-
tutional Courts can only decide cases and controversies in which an
essential element is a binding and final judgment on the parties. As
stated by Justice Jackson, when the Court refused to review an order of
the Civil Aeronautics Board which in effect was a mere recommendation
to the President for his final action:
To revise or review an administrative decision that has only the
force of a recommendation to the President, would be to render an
advisory opinion in its most obnoxious form-advice that the President
has not asked, tendered at the demand of a private litigant on a subject
concededly within the President's exclusive ultimate control. This
Court early and wisely determined that it would not give advisory
opinions even when asked by the Chief Executive. It has also been
the firm and unvarying practice of Constitutional Courts to render no
judgment not binding and conclusive on the parties, and none that are
subject to later review or alteration by administrative action.6
At least one reseacher has maintained that the rule against advisory
opinions has not been as iron-clad as the general impression of it seems to
be. According to Albertswaith's, "Advisory Functions in Federal Su-
preme Court":
The Court rendered an advisory opinion to President Monroe in
response to a request for legal advice on the power of the Government
to appropriate federal funds for public improvements by responding that
Congress might do so under the War and Postal Powers. The inhibi-
tions of the Court against advisory opinions do not prevent the individual
Justices from giving advice or aiding the political departments in their
private capacities. [Those who criticized Justice Fortas along this
line were evidently not aware of this exception to the general rule.]
Ever since Chief Justice Jay went on a mission to England to negotiate
a treaty, the members of the Court have performed various non-judicial
functions. John Marshall served simultaneously as Secretary of State
and Chief Justice [sic] and later Justice Robert Jackson served as War
Crimes Prosecutor.7
0 C and S Airlines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948) citing the
following cases: Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792); United States v. Fevreira,
13 How. 40 (1852); Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 (1864); In Re San-
born, 148 U.S. 222 (1893) ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S.
447 (1894); La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 (1899);
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911) ; United States v. Jefferson Electric
Co., 291 U.S. 386 (1934).
'23 GEO. L.J. 643 (1935).
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Cases and Controversies
The Court's rule against advisory opinions is based upon the broader
rule that only cases or controversies can come before the court. Justice
Field in the cases of In re Pacific Ry. Com'n,s and in Smith v. Adams9
said:
Controversies to the extent that they differ from cases include only
suits of a civil nature. By cases and controversies are intended the
claims of litigants brought before the courts for determination by such
regular proceedings as are established by law or custom for the pro-
tection of or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punish-
ment of wrongs.
Whenever the claim of a party under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States .takes such a form that the judicial power is
capable of acting upon it, then it has become a case. The term implies
the existence of present or possible adverse parties whose contentions
are submitted to the Court for adjudication.
This definition was reanforced in the Muskrat case"0 in which the
court held that the exercise of judicial power is limited to cases and con-
troversies and emphasized "adverse litigants," "adverse interests," and
"actual controversy," and conclusiveness, or finality of judgment as
essential elements of a case.
A more recent pronouncement on the subject was given by Justice
Frankfurter in a concurring opinion in Anti-Fascist Committee v. Mc-
Grath," he wrote:
A court will not decide a question unless the nature of the action
challenged, the kind of injury inflicted, and the relationship between
the parties are such that judicial determination is consonant with what
was, generally speaking, the business of the colonial courts and the
Courts of Westminster when the Constitution was framed. The juris-
diction of the federal courts can be invoked only under circumstances
which to the expert feel of lawyers constitute a "case or controversy."
Three professors at the University of Minnesota Law School' 2 have
prepared a valuable tool for the teaching of Constitutional Law.'" In
S32 F. 241 (1887).
130 U.S. 167 (1889).
10219 U.S. 346 (1911).
11341 U.S. 123 (1951).
1" Professor and Dean, William B. Lockart, Professor Yale Kamison, and Pro-
fessor Jessie H. Choper.
" "Constitutional Law-Cases-Comments-Questions," West Publishing Com-
pany (1964).
6
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their "notes and questions" that follow leading cases, they have made
extensive use of the works of outstanding authorities on Constitutional
Law, by drawing heavily upon their books, and published articles and by
the use of pertinent extractions.
Following the section of this book devoted to "Cases and Contro-
versies" with the subheading "Advisory Opinions, "14 they have set forth
the pro's and con's of advisory opinions reinforced with references to
leading authorities.' 5 This passage is so thought-provoking and such
a good guide to the interested reader, that the writer of this article sets
forth the passage in some detail.
Question :-" (a) Do you agree with the well established principle that
bars the court from advising the Congress on the constitutionality of
legislation? Consider note, "Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality
of Statutes," 69 HARV. L. REV. 1302, 1305 (1956). Before it is suc-
cessfully challenged, an unconstitutional statute may discourage legiti-
mate activity, or conversely, it may encourage reliance which, when
the statute is invalidated, will prove to have been ill-founded, thus
causing injury to those who have based action upon it. Further . . .
there is frequently an unnecessary expenditure of time and money when
the state enacts a statute, invalidates it in lengthy judicial proceedings,
and subsequently must enact new legislation; this waste would seem
particularly great when the government sets up elaborate machinery
to implement a statute held unconstitutional.
Question: Is this sort of advisory opinion any different than [sic]
carefully considered dicta in a real case or controversy? Consider
Note, "The Case for an Advisory Function in the Federal Judiciary,"
50 Geo. L.J. 785, 799 (1962). [P]ast legislative programs frustrated
by an adverse opinion have often been salvaged once the constitutional
pitfalls were mapped by the court. The court itself has recognized
these facts and often furnished explicit advice for the anticipated second
attempt. 16 Thus an established advisory practice . . . already exists
... direct advice in the form of judicial dicta. The price paid for even
the indirect advice was, however, an unconstitutional statute. Is this
contention simply answered by the fact that political action is often
taken on the basis of weighty dicta, and its dislocation by later decisions
erasing the dicta adds needlessly to the functions of government?
Frankfurter and Hart, "The Business of t'he Supreme Court at October
Term," 1934, 49 HARV. L. REV. 68, 105 (1935), or is the final
objection removed by giving advisory opinions the force of precedent?
"Id., pp. 47-51.
'5 Id., p. 51.
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(b) Consider Comment, The Advisory Opinion and the United States
Supreme Court, 5 FoRD L. REV. 94, 108 (1936). The advisory opinion
it is said [by Frankfurter, "A Note on Advisory Opinions," 37 HARv.
L. REV. 1002 (1924)] would distort the entire focus of the judicial
function, in that it would require the Court to express its judgment on
abortive issues without the benefit of all the relevant facts which, in
crucial constitutional questions, are the very heart of the case. In addi-
tion, the operation of the device would debilitate the creative responsi-
bility of the legislature, in that it would tend to induce reliance upon the
judiciary, depriving the former of submitting its convictions to the test
of trial and error and of accumulating new facts for the vindication of
its judgment which, a priori may run counter to settled legal principles.
(i) As to the "facts" argument, might this be cured by having Congress
present the court a specific set of facts, real or assumed? Or by having
the court confine its attention to the statute's application to what it
considers to be the most common set of facts intended to be covered?
May these practices be truly analogous to presenting the court with a
regularly litigated fact situation? Consider Frankfurter and Hart note
1 (a) supra at 96: "The Court's sense of its position and function as an
appellate tribunal leads it to emphasize .. .data already explored by
trial and intermediate tribunals. This insistence rests ... upon aware-
ness of adjudication as a process . .. in which the deliberations of
successive tribunals serve to illumine final judgment and in which par-
ticularly 'the special knowledge of local conditions' possessed by local
tribunals may be indispensable." In how many constitutional cases
are the litigated facts crucial ?
(ii) As to the 'responsibility of the legislature' argument, might this
be cured by limiting the advisory opinion to statutes fully considered
and already passed by Congress? Is there any answer to the point
that the cumulative experience of a statute's operation may shed great
light on its constitutionality? If not, is the point sufficient to sustain
present practice regarding advisory opinions ?
(c) Is the opposition to advisory opinions justified by the fact that
"only when [the experienced judge] has had the benefit of intelligent
and vigorous advocacy on both sides can he feel fully confident of his
decision"? "Professional Responsibility," 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1161
(1958). Could the court before rendering an advisory opinion, invite
the submission of briefs and presentation of arguments by interested
parties on both sides of the question? Consider Note, 69 HARv. L.
REV. 1302, 1309-10 (1956) : "Argument in advisory proceedings might
in some situations provide more assistance to the court than would
argument in a normal adversary proceeding. Representation of diversi-
fied interests might provide the Justices with a more realistic perspective
on the statute than representation of only two parties; and unlike
8
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ordinary litigation where the prosecutor or plaintiff... may be able to
select an opponent with little interest in the proceeding or one who is
peculiarly culpable, the parties seeking to appear will generally be
strong antagonists." See also Arnold, "Trial by Combat and the
New Deal," 47 HARV. L. REV. 913 (1934).
The question quoted above as to whether an advisory opinion is really
any different from carefully considered dicta in a real case or controversy,
can support an elaborate answer. Several cases come to mind in which the
court provided advice on what would be a constitutional course of legisla-
tion and action in matters or on questions that have affected and shaped
the political, social, and economic course of American society.
One of these cases is Dred Scott v. Sanford" in which the court went
out of its way to declare by dicta the unconstitutionality of the Missouri
Compromise (which restricted slavery to certain geographical limits), to
reassert the status of a slave as property whose owner was free to take
anywhere in the United States without his status as slave property being
changed. The court could have rested its decision with the finding that
Scott had no standing to sue under the diversity of citizenship provision
of the Constitution because as plaintiff he had not established citizenship
in a state different from that of the defendant's residence. However,
Chief Justice Taney went on to say that not only was Scott, the plaintiff,
not a citizen, but that no Negro was or could be a citizen of the United
States, and that at the time the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution were being formulated, a Negro had no rights that a white
man was bound to respect. This last statement produced great political
and moral exacerbation on the part of many people, white and black, by
their mis-reading or by their mistaken belief that the Chief Justice said
that as of the time of the case or the writing of his opinion, a Negro
had no rights that a white man was bound to respect. The dicta of this
opinion was intended, so it appears, to be advisory to the North and the
South on the question of slavery. It gave encouragement to the pro-
slavery advocates and consternation to the anti-slavery forces. Some his-
torians list it as one of the causes of the Civil War.
Another such case was that of Plessy v. Ferguson.'" This case
probably did more to plant the seeds of racism in American society than
any other occurrence since the Civil War, seeds whose bitter harvest we
are now reaping.
1 19 How. 393; 15 L.Ed 691 (1857).
"8 163 U.S. 537; 16 S. Ct. 1138; 41 L.Ed 256 (1896).
9
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The case turned upon the constitutionality of an act of the General
Assembly of the State of Louisiana, providing for separate railway car-
riages for the white and colored races. The act also empowered the officers
(conductors) on the trains to separate the passengers by race, and pro-
vided a fine and imprisonment for anyone violating the act. This legisla-
tion was in answer to a statute having the opposite effect passed by the
Reconstruction Legislature of Louisiana forbidding the separation of
the races in public transportation, etc. This act had been struck down
by the Supreme Court in the case of Hall v. DeCuir'9 on the grounds
that it was state interference with interstate commerce. In the Plessy
case, the court upheld the Act of the Louisiana Legislature, thus setting
the standard of "separate but equal," which legalized and ushered in the
era of legalized segregation and discrimination throughout the South,
practices and policies from which race relations in this country have
suffered so much.
Justice Brown in his opinion went on by way of dicta to advise the
white race that its policy of racial superiority could be justified; he said:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's (the case was
brought on a petition for a writ of prohibition) argument to consist in
the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the
colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason
of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses
to put this construction upon it. The argument necessarily assumes that
if, as has been more than once the case, and is not unlikely to be so
again, the colored race should become the dominant power in the state
legislature and should enact a law in precisely similar terms, it would
relegate the white race to an inferior position. We imagine that the
white race, at least, would not acquiesce in this assumption ....
The most pernicious result, however, flowing from this case was
Justice Brown's covert advice to the states that they could establish
separate schools for the two races. He did this by basing his opinion
on the case of Roberts v. City of Boston2 ° in which the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts had upheld the power of Boston to provide separate schools
for Negro children. He carefully failed to mention that the City of
Boston had abandoned and abolished the separate school plan long before
the time his opinion was written.
1995 U.S. 485 (1875).
205 Cush. 198 (1849).
10
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As was stated above, this case, with its not so covert advice to the
Southern States, did more to plant and nourish the seeds of racism than
any other occurrence since the Civil War. Justice Harlan's dissent in this
case turned out to be quite prophetic. Justice Harlan wrote in Plessy:
The present decision, it may well be apprehended, will not only
stimulate aggressions, more or less brutal and irritating, upon admitted
rights of colored citizens, but will encourage the belief that it is
possible, by means of state enactments, to defeat the beneficient purposes
which the people of the United States had in view when they adopted the
recent amendments of the Constitution, by one of which the blacks of this
country were made citizens of the United States and of the states in
which they respectively reside, and whose privileges and immunities,
as citizens, the states are forbidden to abridge. Sixty millions of whites
are in no danger here from the presence of eight millions of blacks.
The destinies of the two races, in this country, are indissolubly linked
together, and the interests of both require that the common government
of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the
sanction of law. What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more
certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between the races,
than state enactments, which in fact, proceed on the ground that colored
citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to
sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens? That, as all will
admit, is the real meaning of all such legislation as was enacted in
Louisiana.
The sure guarantee of the peace and security of each race is the
clear, distinct, unconditonal recognition by our governments, national
and state, of every right that inheres in civil freedom, and of the
equality before the law of all citizens of the United States, without
regard to race. State enactments regulating the enjoyment of civil
rights upon the basis of race, and cunningly devised to defeat legitimate
results of the war, under the pretense of recognizing equality of rights,
can have no other result than to render permanent peace impossible,
and to keep alive a conflict of races, the continuance of which must do
harm to all concerned....
All persons familiar with the current plight of race relations in this
country know that Justice Harlan was a good prophet, and his prediction
has just about come true. On the other hand, Justice Brown's advisory
dicta set forth the very damaging concept which persists until today, that
social equality cannot exist between the white and black races in this
country. His opinion did more than anything else to lay the foundation
for racism according to the definition of it found in Webster's Dictionary:
11
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"Racism-assumption of inherent racial superiority or the purity and
superiority of certain races, and consequent discrimination against other
races; also any doctrine or program of racial domination and discrimina-
tion based on such an assumption. .. "
The Southern States took the advice of this opinion literally and all
of them passed legislative enactments providing for the separation and
segregation of the two races (the notorious Jim Crow laws). Many of the
people of the other states accepted the spirit of the opinion and set up many
of the same patterns of separation and segregation without the help of
state laws.
It is interesting to contemplate what American society would be like
today if the Harlan opinion, and not that of Justice Brown, had been the
majority opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson.
Perhaps the most direct advice given in a "case or controversy" situa-
tion was that relating to the exclusion of Negroes from the Democratic
primary in the South, at a time when in most of the Southern States the
primary election was the only meaningful election, and when nomination
by the Democratic primary was tantamount to election to the office sought.
In Nixon v. Herndon,2' a Texas statute forbidding Negroes to par-
ticipate in Democratic primaries was held violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment; following that decision, the statute was repealed and a law
was enacted authorizing the Executive Committee of a political party to
prescribe who might vote in its primaries. Under this statute, the Demo-
cratic Executive Committee adopted a resolution, limiting participation
in the Democratic primary to white persons. The exclusion of Negroes
from voting pursuant to this resolution was held violative of the Four-
teenth Amendment in Nixon v. Condon ;22 the court pointed out that it
was still state action and consequently contrary to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
The court, however, went on to advise that if the Texas State Demo-
cratic Party in convention assembled would pass this restrictive regula-
tion, only it would not be tainted with state action, and therefore, would
not be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. Of course, a State Demo-
cratic convention was immediately called and such action as was suggested
by the court was taken. The exclusion of a Negro from voting in the
Democratic primary of Texas pursuant to this action by the State con-
21273 U.S. 536; 47 S. Ct. 446; 71 L.Ed. 759 (1926).
22 286 U.S. 73; 52 S. Ct. 484, 487; 76 L.Ed. 984; 88 A.L.R. 458 (1932).
12
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vention was held not violative of his constitutional right in Grovey v.
Townsend.
23
The suggestion made by the court in Nixon v. Condon was certainly
advisory, and the State of Texas accepted it as such. The only differ-
ence between the results of this disguised form of advisory opinion and
one that might be given without a "case or controversy" to support it is,
perhaps, a difference in the time the advice can be put into effect.
When the results on American life and society, flowing from the cases
cited above, are considered, it appears that the objections to the pro forma
type of advisory opinion, without "a case or controversy" is a legal exer-
cise of straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel.
"3295 U.S. 45; 55 S. Ct. 622; 79 L.Ed. 1292; 97 A.L.R. 680 (1935). This case
and holding were expressly overruled in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299; 61
S. Ct. 1031; 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941).
13
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